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Abstract—Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is a communi-
cation paradigm that emphasizes content distribution. Named-
Data Networking (NDN) is an instantiation of CCN, a candidate
Future Internet Architecture. NDN supports human-readable
content naming and router-based content caching which lends
itself to efficient, secure and scalable content distribution. Because
of NDN’s fundamental requirement that each content object must
be signed by its producer, fragmentation has been considered
incompatible with NDN since it precludes authentication of
individual content fragments by routers. The alternative is to
perform hop-by-hop reassembly, which incurs prohibitive delays.
In this paper, we show that secure and efficient content frag-
mentation is both possible and even advantageous in NDN and
similar content-centric network architectures that involve signed
content. We design a concrete technique that facilitates efficient
and secure content fragmentation in NDN, discuss its security
guarantees and assess performance. We also describe a prototype
implementation and compare performance of cut-through with
hop-by-hop fragmentation and reassembly.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a de facto public utility used by a significant
fraction of the humankind who rely on it for numerous
daily activities. However, despite unparalleled success and
unexpected longevity, the current TCP/IP-based protocol archi-
tecture may be obsolete. To this end, several research efforts
to design a next-generation Internet architecture have sprung
up in recent years [24].
One key motivator for a new Internet architecture is the
fundamental shift in the nature of traffic: from the mainly
low-bandwidth interactive (e.g., remote log-in) and store-
and-forward (e.g., email) nature of the early Internet to the
web-dominated Internet of today. At the same time, massive
and rapidly-increasing amounts of content are produced and
consumed (distributed) over the Internet. This transpires over
social networks such as Facebook, media-sharing sites such
as YouTube and productivity services such as GoogleDocs.
Consequently, the emphasis of Internet communication has
shifted from telephony-like conversations between two IP
interfaces to a consumer who wants content delivered rapidly
and securely, regardless of where it comes from. This motivates
reconsidering the Internet architecture.
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) [15], [17], [19] is an
approach to (inter-)networking designed for efficient, secure
and scalable content distribution [17]. In CCN, named content
– rather than named interfaces or hosts – is treated as a first-
class entity. Named-Data Networking (NDN) [23] is an exam-
ple of CCN that stipulates that each piece of named content
must be signed by its producer (also known as publisher).
This allows decoupling of trust in content from trust in an
entity (host or router) that might store and/or disseminate
that content. These NDN features facilitate in-network caching
of content to optimize bandwidth use, reduce latency, and
enable effective simultaneous utilization of multiple network
interfaces.
NDN is an on-going research effort and one of several
architectures being considered as a candidate future Internet
architecture. Other such efforts include: ChoiceNet [34], XIA
[16], Mobility-First [29] and Nebula [3]. Regardless of which,
if any, approach eventually succeeds, all of them need to
address some of the same issues, such as naming/addressing,
routing/forwarding and security/privacy.
A. Fragmentation:
One issue that straddles both networking (specifically,
packet forwarding) and security is fragmentation of large
packets. Originally present in IPv4 [27], intermediate frag-
mentation was deprecated in IPv6 [11], for a number of
reasons, many of which were identified in by Mogul [18], e.g.,
router overhead and code complexity. Also, there have been
attacks that took advantage of IPv4 reassembly [35]. Thus,
eschewing fragmentation made sense for IPv6. However, the
same might not hold for all network architectures. We show in
Section IV that, for some very different types of networking,
such as CCN/NDN, fragmentation is sometimes unavoidable
and might even be beneficial.
B. Focus:
This work represents the first exploration of efficient and
secure fragmentation in the context of CCN/NDN. Its primary
value is the construction of a secure fragmentation scheme
which addresses several important security and efficiency
issues. (Section VIII-B describes current handling of fragmen-
tation in CCN/NDN.)
The intended contribution of this paper is two-fold: First,
we discuss, in detail, numerous issues related to fragmentation
of both interest and content packets in NDN and arrive at the
following key conclusions:
• Interest fragmentation is unavoidable: if encountered,
hop-by-hop reassembly is a must.
• Content fragmentation is similarly unavoidable.
• Minimal MTU discovery helps, but does not obviate the
need for fragmentation.
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• Intermediate reassembly is viable but buffering can be
costly and latency is problematic.
• Intermediate re-fragmentation is also unavoidable for con-
tent fetched from router caches.
• Reconciling cut-through forwarding of fragments (no
intermediate reassembly) with content authentication is
possible in an efficient manner.
Second, we construct a secure fragmentation and reassembly
method for content-centric networks architectures, exemplified
by NDN. We call this method Fragmentation with Integrity
Guarantees and Optional Authentication or FIGOA. It supports
fragmentation of content packets at NDN network layer and
allows cut-through switching in routers by avoiding hop-by-
hop fragmentation and reassembly, thus lowering end-to-end
delay. However, even though cut-through switching reduces
latency, it allows fragments to be temporarily stored in routers
awaiting verification by FIGOA. This might result in exhaust-
ing routers resources if fragment-drop rate increases. To solve
this issue, routers adaptively set time-outs for temporarily
stored fragments. (This issue is not discussed further, as it
is outside the scope of this paper.)
FIGOA is fundamentally compatible with the NDN’s tenet
of not securing the channel but rather the content flowing
through it. As its basis, FIGOA employs a delayed authen-
tication method similar to [33], which allows routers to ver-
ify signed content based on out-of-order arriving fragments.
Furthermore, FIGOA supports nested (successive or recursive)
fragmentation. In the event that a given content ultimately fails
either integrity or authenticity check, reassembly and eventual
delivery of corrupt content to consumers is prevented.
a) Organization: Section II provides some background
on NDN. Then, Section III summarizes fragmentation in IP.
Fragmentation issues in NDN are discussed Section IV, The
proposed FIGOA scheme is presented in Section V. Section VI
describes its prototype implementation which is then evaluated
in Section VII. Next, Section VIII overviews related work. The
paper ends with the summary and future work in Section IX.
II. NDN OVERVIEW
This section overviews NDN. In case of familiarity with
NDN, it can be skipped with no lack of continuity.
NDN supports two types of packets: interest and con-
tent [8]. The latter contains a human-readable name, ac-
tual data (content), and a digital signature over the packet
computed by the content producer. Names are hierarchically
structured, e.g. /ndn/usa/cnn/frontpage/news where
“/” is the boundary between name components. An interest
packet contains the name of the content being requested,
or a name prefix, e.g. /ndn/usa/cnn/ is a prefix of
/ndn/usa/cnn/frontpage/news. In case of multiple
contents under a given name prefix, optional control infor-
mation can be carried within the interest to restrict the content
returned. Content signatures provide data origin authenticity,
however, trust management between a key and a name prefix
is the responsibility of the application.
All NDN communication is initiated by a (content) con-
sumer that sends an interest for a specific content. NDN routers
forward this interest towards the content producer responsible
for the requested name, using name prefixes (instead of today’s
IP prefixes) for routing. A Forwarding Information Base (FIB)
is a lookup table used to determine interfaces for forwarding
incoming interests, and contains [name prefix, interface] en-
tries. Multiple entries with the same name prefix are allowed,
supporting multiple paths over which a given name prefix
namespace is reachable. Akin to an IP forwarding table, FIB
can be populated either by a routing protocol or manually.
NDN communication adheres to the “pull” model, whereby
content is delivered to consumers only following an explicit
request (interest). NDN content includes several fields. In this
paper, we are only interested in the following:
• Signature – a public key signature, generated by the
content producer, covering the entire content, including
all explicit components of the name and a reference to
the public key needed to verify it.
• Name – a sequence of explicit name components followed
by an implicit digest (hash) component of the content that
is recomputed at every hop. This effectively provides each
content with a unique name and guarantees a match with a
name provided in an interest. However, in most cases, the
hash component is not present in interest packets, since
NDN does not provide any secure mechanism to learn a
content hash a priori.
• KeyLocator – a reference to the public key required
to verify the signature. This field has three options: (1)
verification key, (2) certificate containing the verification
key, or (3) NDN name referencing the content that con-
tains the verification key.
Each NDN router maintains a Pending Interest Table (PIT)
– a lookup table containing outstanding [interest, arrival-
interface(s)] entries. The first component of each entry reflects
the name of requested content, and the second – a set of
interfaces via which interests for this content have arrived.
When an NDN router receives an interest, it looks up its PIT
to determine whether an interest for the eponymous content is
pending. There are three possible outcomes:
1) If the same name is already in the router’s PIT and the
arrival interface of the present interest is already in the
set of arrival-interfaces of the corresponding PIT entry,
the interest is discarded.
2) If a PIT entry for the same name exists, yet the arrival
interface is new, the router updates the PIT entry by
adding a new interface to the set; the interest is not
forwarded further.
3) Otherwise, the router looks up its cache (called Content
Store) for a matching content. If it succeeds, the cached
content is returned and no new PIT entry is needed.
Conversely, if no matching content is found, the router
creates a new PIT entry and forwards the interest using
its FIB.
An interest might reach the actual content producer if no
corresponding content has been cached by any intervening
router on the path between consumer and producer. Upon
receipt of the interest, the producer injects requested content
into the network, thus satisfying the interest. The content is
then forwarded towards the consumer, traversing – in reverse
– the path of the preceding interest. Each router on the path
flushes state (deletes the PIT entry) containing the satisfied
2
interest and forwards the content out on all arrival interfaces
of the associated interest. In addition, each router may cache a
copy of forwarded content. Unlike their IP counterparts, NDN
routers can forward interests out on multiple interfaces in order
to increase likelihood of fastest content retrieval.
Not all interests result in content being returned. If an
interest encounters either: (1) a router that can not forward it
further or (2) a content producer that has no such content, no
error packets are generated. PIT entries in intervening routers
simply expire if content can not be retrieved. The consumer
(who also maintains its local PIT) can choose to re-issue the
same interest after a timeout.
III. FRAGMENTATION SYNOPSIS
We define fragmentation as a means of splitting large
packets into smaller packets, at the network layer, independent
of content publisher and without changing any actual content.
This is in contrast with segmentation where a content publisher
splits a large content object into smaller ones, signing and
naming each separately. TCP/IP has an analogous dichotomy:
TCP segments a byte stream into IP packets, whereas, IPv4
can fragment IP packets into smaller packets in order to fit
them into a link MTU.
Since late 1980s, network-layer fragmentation has been
widely considered to be a headache and something to be
avoided, based primarily on the IPv4 experience [18]. To
understand this further, we briefly discuss IPv4 fragmentation
concepts.
Packet fragmentation is not a singular concept; it can be di-
vided into two types: source-based and network-based. Source-
based fragmentation is performed exclusively by the sender
and is relatively simple: assuming knowledge of the Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) for a given path to the destination,
the source can fragment a packet with almost1 no fear that
further fragmentation might be encountered along the path. Of
course, knowledge of the MTU does not come for free; an
MTU discovery protocol is needed, e.g., [21]. Also, the whole
premise of source-based fragmentation is questionable: Why
should the source fragment a large IP packet instead of simply
“segmenting” it into a sequence of separate IP packets [20]?
Source-based segmentation often allows for more efficient use
of smaller datagrams; for example, segmented TCP datagrams
can be individually ACKed, whereas a larger TCP segment
split using IP fragmentation can only be processed as a whole
by TCP.
Network-based fragmentation requires routers to support
extra functionality (i.e., additional code) which entails ap-
preciable processing overhead [18]. Having to fragment a
packet takes a router off its critical path and can thus cause
congestion; this can also be exploited as denial-of-service
attack. Nonetheless, at a conceptual level, it can be claimed that
intermediate fragmentation offers better bandwidth utilization
than its source based counterpart, or no fragmentation at all.
Further issues are prompted by reassembly of fragments.
In IPv4, reassembly takes place only at the destination. Each
IP packet is allocated a buffer that stores fragments that have
1Dynamic routing in IP may cause successive packets to take different paths,
affecting the source’s perceived MTU.
arrived thus far; possibly, out-of-order. Once all fragments are
received, the packet is physically reassembled and passed on
to the upper layer. This seemingly simple procedure has been
a source of many attacks and exploits [35]. Reassembly by
intermediate hops/routers is not viable in IP, since fragments
of the same packet are not guaranteed to travel over the same
path.
IV. FRAGMENTATION IN NDN
NDN architecture does not provide explicit support for
in-network fragmentation [1]. However, current NDN im-
plementation, that runs as part of the NDN testbed [2], is
implemented as an overlay on top of TCP or UDP. In this
a setup, fragmentation is handled by either: (1) transport
layer protocols, i.e.,TCP segmentation, or by (2) network layer
protocols, i.e., IP fragmentation. Moreover, if NDN is running
directly over the link layer, protocols such as NDNLP [31]
can be used to handle fragmentation. (See Section VIII-B for
details.) The main drawback of these methods is that they all
need reassembly at every hop.
The rest of this section discusses certain factors motivating
fragmentation in NDN. Using terminology in Figure 1, frag-
mentation is considered in the context of interest and content
packets, respectively.
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU): largest unit (packet) size
for network-layer transmission over a given link between two
adjacent nodes.
Publisher or Producer: an entity that produces and signs content;
we use these two terms interchangeably.
Consumer: an entity that requests (consumes) content.
Router: a network-layer entity that routes content but neither
produces nor consumes it (except perhaps for routing infor-
mation).
Content object (CO): a unit of NDN data, named and signed by
its producer/publisher.
Content fragment (CF): a unit of NDN network layer transmis-
sion; content fragment is the same as content object if the latter
fits within the MTU of a link between two adjacent routers.
Segmentation: a process of partitioning large content into separate
content objects by explicitly naming and signing each one. Can
be performed only by a producer of content.
Fragmentation: a process of splitting an (already signed and
named) content object into multiple content fragments. Can
be performed by a producer, a router or any other NDN entity
that produces, stores or caches content.
Re-fragmentation: a process of splitting a fragment of a content
object into multiple fragments. Sometimes referred to as inter-
network fragmentation [18]. Can be performed by a router.
Reassembly: a process of re-composing a content object from its
fragments. Can be performed by a consumer or a router (in
case of intermediate reassembly).
Fragment Buffering: a process of maintaining a stash of frag-
ments until complete packet reassembly becomes possible.
Cut-Through Switching (of fragments): forwarding of individ-
ual content fragments without reassembly.
Fig. 1. Terminology
A. Fragmentation of Interests
As discussed in Section II, an interest packet carries the
name of content requested by the consumer. NDN does not
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mandate any confidentiality, integrity or authenticity require-
ments for interest packets. Due to no limitation on the length
of content names, it is quite plausible that an interest packet
carrying a very long name might not fit into a network-layer
MTU, thus prompting the need for source-based and/or inter-
mediate fragmentation. Fortunately, this does not pose any real
challenges, since the “design space” of interest fragmentation
is very confined. Specifically, we claim that:
If interest packets are fragmented and, possibly re-
fragmented, hop-by-hop (intermediate) reassembly of frag-
mented interest packets is a necessity.
This claim is easy to support because, as described in
Section II, each router that receives an interest must look up
its PIT and/or cache using the name carried in that interest. If
the name itself spans multiple fragments which are processed
independently (without reassembly), such lookups are infeasi-
ble.
Furthermore, since the consumer issuing an interest has no
a priori knowledge of the smallest MTU on the path to the
closest copy of requested content, it can not pre-fragment an
interest in order to avoid further fragmentation by intermediate
routers, unless there is a well-defined global minimum MTU
for NDN interests.
Based on the above, for the remainder of this paper, we
assume source-based (and possibly intermediate) fragmenta-
tion coupled with intermediate reassembly for interests. The
remaining discussion of fragmentation is limited to NDN
content packets.
B. Fragmentation of Content
Recall that NDN mandates each content to be signed by
its producer. This means that, in principle, any NDN entity,
whether router or consumer2 is able to check content integrity
and authenticity, based on the producer’s public key, itself
embedded in a separate signed content (a de facto credential or
certificate). The public key can be either referred to by name
in the content header, or enclosed in its entirety as part of the
content.
Consequently, in order to abide by NDN tenets, fragmen-
tation must not preclude routers from verifying signatures, i.e.,
checking authenticity and integrity of content. This speaks in
favor of either: (1) no intermediate fragmentation at all, or (2)
intermediate (hop-by-hop) reassembly.
1) Producer-based Fragmentation or Segmentation: At
the first glance, there seems to be no reason for a content pro-
ducer to fragment large content. Instead, it can simply segment
it into individually named and separately signed content ob-
jects. This segmentation approach is sensible for content meant
to be pushed (e.g., email) or generated dynamically, e.g., in
response to a database query. Segment size can be determined
from an MTU discovery protocol (see Section IV-B2 below).
This would assure no intermediate fragmentation.
However, for content that is meant to be pulled (dis-
tributed), a producer may benefit from signing and naming
2 Content signature verification is mandatory for consumers and optional
for routers.
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Fig. 2. Byte count overhead for small signed segments
it once and not worrying about repeating (possibly expensive)
segmentation procedure each time it receives an interest for
the same content. In this case, when an interest arrives, the
producer may choose to fragment a previously produced con-
tent object. This entails no real-time cryptographic overhead.
Alternatively, a producer could choose to segment content
using the smallest MTU of all of its interfaces, thus incurring
even less processing at interest arrival time.
An important issue is the content header overhead incurred
when generating small-size segments. Segmenting a large
object into many MTU-sized segments requires each of them
to have its own header, dominated by the Signature component
which contains a number of fields.
Without getting into details of NDN signature format,
Figure 2 shows the overhead of segmenting larger objects down
to MTU size. We use a standard 1, 500-byte link MTU and
SHA-256 as the hash algorithm. We considered both RSA-
1536 and RSA-2048 signatures. The Signature field therefore
contains: 12 bytes of fixed overhead (headers), actual signature
bits (192 bytes for RSA-1536, 256 bytes for RSA-2048).
However, estimating the exact size of the signature field is
more complex. This is because the KeyLocator field (which
is part of the signature field) can be of arbitrary size (and
if it carries a certificate, it can be very large). For now, we
assume a small 20-byte KeyLocator, along with an SHA-
256 hash. Figure 2 shows that there is a definite penalty for
segmenting at the publisher. Even in the most favorable case
(8KB data objects, RSA-1536), over 30% of the bits are wasted
on redundant information. As we move to larger objects, this
overhead can grow to 50%.
2) Whither Intermediate Fragmentation: Regardless of
whether a producer segments or fragments content, interme-
diate fragmentation can not avoided or ruled out, since NDN
does not mandate a globally minimal MTU. Even if it existed,
segmenting content to adhere to this MTU might be very
wasteful due to poor bandwidth utilization (on links that have
higher MTUs) and cryptographic overhead due to increased
costs of signature generation by producers and signature veri-
fication by consumers as well as (optionally) by routers.
Another possibility is to introduce an MTU discovery
method, whereby, for example, an interest traveling towards
requested content could have a new field reflecting the smallest
MTU (µMTU) discovered thus far on its path.3 This is a viable
3This is actually the MTU of the opposite link direction from the direction
the interest traveled - links may have asymmetric MTUs.
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and light-weight approach, particularly because, in NDN, a
content must traverse, in reverse, the very same path taken
by an interest for that content. Hence, when the first entity
that stores, caches or produces requested content receives
an interest, it can use µMTU to fragment (or segment, if
this entity is the producer). Note that “entity” could encom-
pass: (1) an application-level repository that stores content it
does not produce, (2) a router that caches content or a (3)
producer/publisher that generates its own content. This way,
fragmentation would occur only once per interest.
However, fragmentation via interest-based µMTU discov-
ery does not eliminate the need for re-fragmentation. Consider
the following scenario:
1) Consumer A issues interest intA for CO to router R.
2) R receives and marks intA with µMTU =MTU(R→A)
(MTU corresponding R − A link). It then creates a PIT
entry for intA.
3) R forwards intA to adjacent producer P .
4) Since MTU(P→R) > µMTU (R→A), P does not change
µMTU in intA.
5) P immediately satisfies intA, fragmenting CO according
to µMTU .
6) Meanwhile, between Step 3 and now, consumer B issues
interest intB and forwards it to R.
7) R receives intB and marks it with MTU(R→B) where
MTU(R→B) < µMTU . R collapses intB into existing
PIT entry for intA. At this time R is buffering fragments
which have arrived from P , however, not all fragments
of CO have arrived yet.
8) R partially satisfies intB using fragments available in the
buffer, previously forwarded to A. These fragments are
re-fragmented with MTU(R→B). Any further fragments
which arrive from P are also re-fragmented by R to B
using MTU(R→B).
Despite the fact that µMTU discovery does not eliminate re-
fragmentation, it is practically free in terms of extra processing
and bandwidth overhead. More importantly, it results in less
re-fragmentation, since it assures that re-fragmentation occurs
at most once for each collapsed interest at each intermediate
router. This can be particularly advantageous in the case of
monotonically shrinking MTUs where re-fragmentation must
occur at each hop. With µMTU, this is curtailed at the source
of content (which is either some intermediate router or the
producer) due to pre-fragmentation.
C. Considering Intermediate Reassembly
We now discuss intermediate reassembly. There are at least
two factors that motivate it.
First, we consider the case of increasing MTUs on links
that compose the reverse path taken by content fragments on
the way to the consumer. If MTUs increase monotonically, it
might make sense to reassemble fragments (at least partially)
to obtain better bandwidth utilization. However, this benefit
is arguably outweighed by costs incurred by reassembly, i.e.,
processing, memory and code in routers. (Recall that, as in
today’s IPv4, reassembly would require a router to maintain
a separate buffer pool for all fragments of a given content
received so far.)
Number of flows
5 10 20 30 50 100
Inter-fragment gap (ms) 0.52 1.04 2.08 3.12 5.20 10.4
First-to-last fragment gap (ms) 3.22 6.34 12.58 18.82 31.30 62.50
E2E latency: reassembly (ms) 105.79 130.75 180.67 230.59 330.43 580.03
E2E latency: cut-through (ms) 83.22 86.34 92.58 98.82 111.30 142.50
Reassembly slowdown %-age 127.12 151.43 195.14 233.34 296.87 407.03
TABLE I. LATENCY DUE TO PER-HOP CONTENT REASSEMBLY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Number of fragments per object
E
n
d
-t
o-
en
d
la
te
n
cy
(m
s)
Hop-by-hop reassembly
Cut-through fragment forwarding
Fig. 3. Latency with different fragment counts per object
The second factor is security: if a fragment does not carry
the content producer’s signature, how can a router check
its authenticity? As mentioned earlier, NDN stipulates that
routers, though not required to do so, must be able to verify
content signatures. As we argued above, it seems infeasible
for the producer to pre-fragment or pre-segment content such
that each possible future fragment of that content would carry
the producer’s signature.
Hop-by-hop reassembly of content fragments would clearly
solve the problem and address both factors mentioned above.
With it, a router would receive fragments in arbitrary order and
neither cache nor forward them until all fragments arrive. It
would then reassembles them and verify the content signature
with the producer’s public key. (See Section V-E for more
details.)
The main problem with hop-by-hop reassembly is in-
creased end-to-end latency, resulting into lower throughput
for adaptive algorithms, such as TCP. If multiple flows are
passing through the router, the fairest distribution of latency
overhead is to interleave fragments, as in MLPPP LFI [32].
This interleaving causes significant latency between consecu-
tive fragments of an object, which grows with the number of
simultaneous flows. Latency accumulates at each hop, since
all fragments need to be reassembled and then re-fragmented
for transmission. The alternative is cut-through fragment for-
warding, where each fragment is forwarded immediately, as it
arrives.
We attempt to evaluate the benefits of cut-through fragment
forwarding by considering a simple topology with a linear 8-
hop path with 100 Mb/s links. Each link accumulates 10ms
of latency, ignoring intra-hop and queuing delays for now. We
assume 8, 400-byte content objects split into 7 fragments of
1, 300 bytes each.
Table I shows the slowdown caused by intermediate re-
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assembly as each node waits for all fragments of an object, for
varying numbers of parallel flows (which controls the amount
of interleaving). Inter-fragment gap is the time elapsed be-
tween consecutive fragments of an object, caused by fragments
of other objects being interleaved. First-to-last fragment gap
is the time elapsed between the arrival of the beginning of the
first fragment and the end of the last fragment. E2E latency
– reassembly is the total latency for each content object, with
intermediate reassembly. E2E latency – cut-through is the total
latency in case of an object fragmented at the first hop and all
fragments cut-through forwarded with no re-fragmentation or
reassembly in route. Finally, Reassembly Slowdown shows the
extra cost of reassembling and refragmenting at every hop, as
compared with cut-through forwarding.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of increased latency for
various object sizes and fragment counts. We re-use the 8-
hop topology described above and vary the number of flows
on each link. Two links (close to the ends) have 10 flows
across them, two links have 20 flows, two links have 50 flows
and the two core links have 100 flows. The graph shows that
even a small number of fragments can significantly increase
latency over commonly seen path lengths and flow counts.
It takes only 6 fragments per object to double end-to-end
latency of hop-by-hop reassembly when compared with cut-
through forwarding of fragments. This clearly shows that any
fragmentation scheme that requires hop-by-hop reassembly of
every content object (as is the case today with CCNx [7]
and NDNLP [31]) incurs severe penalties in a wide-scale
deployment. We believe that content object fragments must be
forwarded in a cut-through fashion; consequently, our scheme
implements this feature.
At this point, it is worth asking: should routers perform
reassembly and verify signatures? And if yes, which ones? We
believe that it does not make much sense for backbone routers
to do so since potential attacks are not likely to originate in
the backbone, but rather at the edges of the Internet. Whereas,
signature verification at stub AS (ingress) routers is more
appropriate, e.g., because of policy dictating that no fraudulent
content must reach consumers.4 Also, stub AS egress routers
might reassemble fragments and verify signatures if there is a
policy disallowing any fraudulent content to exit an AS, e.g.,
for reasons of liability.
The above discussion yields a trivial observation that
reassembly implies ability to verify signatures. However, it
is unclear whether signature verification implies the need for
reassembly. This triggers the following challenge which we
attempt to address in the remainder of this paper:
If content objects are fragmented (and, possibly re-
fragmented) and intermediate reassembly is not viable, can
routers still check content authenticity?
In other words, if verifying integrity/authenticity is the
main reason for intermediate reassembly, is there a way to
obtain the former while avoiding the latter?
D. Fragment Delivery Order
One important issue relevant to intermediate reassembly
and to the proposed technique (Section V) is whether frag-
4Even though NDN stipulates consumer-based signature verification.
ments are always delivered in transmission order between any
two adjacent NDN routers.
Clearly, reassembly is easier if ordered delivery can be
guaranteed. In a hypothetical network setting where NDN
is universally deployed directly on top of the physical net-
work links, ordered delivery of content fragments might be
a reasonable assumption. 5 However, certain connectivity and
communication choices make ordered delivery less likely. For
instance, if adjacent routers support multiple/parallel physical
links with variable speeds, it is possible that an earlier-
transmitted fragment is received later than a later-transmitted
one. Also, an error on one of the links might cause the same
situation even if link speeds are comparable. Even without
multiple links, if pipelined data-link layer transmission is used,
especially over the wireless channel, one fragment could be
corrupted and discarded and the next one could be received
intact, resulting in the latter being received first.
E. Incremental or Deferred Fragment Caching?
Recall that one of the key features of NDN is router-
based content caching. This is not, strictly speaking, a hard
requirement, however, it is expected that each NDN router
will maintain a Content Store (CS), i.e., a cache, of a certain
size.
A router that employs intermediate reassembly can defer
the decision to cache content until it receives all fragments and,
optionally, verifies overall content integrity and/or authentic-
ity. Whereas, a router that employs cut-through switching of
individual fragments has a choice to either: (1) cache frag-
ments incrementally as they arrive, or (2) defer caching (i.e.,
buffer fragments) until all fragments arrive and, optionally,
their overall content integrity and/or authenticity is verified.
Assuming that most content is authentic, the former optimizes
the common case of quickly caching the last fragment once
optional security checks are performed. On the other hand,
incremental caching may complicate matters, since it might,
depending on the specific cache architecture, involve non-
contiguous caching of related fragments.
If deferred caching is used, another fragmentation-and
caching-related issue is how to store fragments? One possibil-
ity is to store them in the same form they arrive. This might
work if no re-fragmentation is performed locally. Otherwise,
it might make sense to store fragments in the form they are
forwarded. This gets more complicated in case of collapsed
interests, i.e., when content needs to be forwarded out on
multiple interfaces with different MTUs. Another approach
would be to proactively re-fragment cached fragments for
all possible link MTUs on the router. This pre-fragmentation
would reduced delay at the cost of additional buffer space.
We believe this issue deserves further consideration; which is
beyond this paper’s scope.
V. SECURE FRAGMENTATION
This section describes a scheme called FIGOA: Fragmen-
tation with Integrity Guarantees and Optional Authentication.
5All content fragments traverse, in reverse, the very same path taken by an
interest.
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It supports arbitrary intermediate fragmentation [18] of con-
tent while preserving security, without requiring intermediate
reassembly.6 FIGOA allows free mixing of routers that do
not perform intermediate reassembly with those that do. It is
primarily geared for routers that support cut-through switching
and maintain dedicated storage for buffering content frag-
ments, distinct from Content Store. While cut-through frag-
ment switching is generally beneficial, it complicates signature
verification, as discussed in Section IV-C, FIGOA addresses
this problem by using delayed authentication.
A. Delayed Authentication
Delayed authentication is an old method described in [33].
Its goal was to: “reconcile fragmentation and dynamic routing
with network-level authentication in IP gateways.” The essence
of delayed authentication is that a given packet’s authenticity
can be obtained from authenticity of its fragments. Packet au-
thentication is computed incrementally as individual fragments
are received (possibly out of order), processed and forwarded
by a router. This requires a queue for each partially received
packet that maintains the current state of partial verification.
For every fragment, incremental verification is performed,
queue state is updated and the fragment is forwarded. Upon
receipt of the final fragment, the router completes verification.
If it succeeds, the final fragment (called a “hostage”) is
forwarded. Otherwise, it is discarded along with the entire
queue. The end-result is that the destination receives the packet
in its entirety only if it is verified by the router.7
Main differences between delayed authentication in its
original IPv4 context [33] and our proposed use in NDN are
as follows:
• Symmetric routing: unlike IP, where fragments of the
same IP packet might travel via different paths, fragments
of the same NDN content are guaranteed to follow the
same sequence of NDN routers, retracing PIT state set
up by a preceding interest. This results in much higher
probability of ordered fragment delivery and faster time-
outs in cases of lost or corrupted fragments. Note that it
is the responsibility of consumers to re-request the entire
content in case of lost or corrupted fragments.
• Not just ingress routers: delayed authentication was ini-
tially designed for ingress routers (i.e., border routers of
the destination’s AS). In NDN, any intermediate router
can unilaterally choose to perform delayed authentication.
• Possible intermediate reassembly: in IP, only the desti-
nation reassembles fragments, whereas, any intervening
router can decide to reassemble whether or not it decides
to do cut-through forwarding.
• Signatures instead of CBC-based MAC: delayed authenti-
cation was initially proposed for authenticating IP packet
traffic flowing between two hosts (in two stub AS-s) that
share a symmetric key. The same key is shared with the
ingress router. Actual packet authentication is attained
via a message authentication code (MAC) based on the
chained-block cipher (CBC) mode of symmetric encryp-
tion. The main idea is to insert intermediate MAC values
6A variant of FIGOA can be used in conjunction with intermediate reassem-
bly, with the key advantage of faster cryptographic processing.
7Recall that, in IPv4, the destination must flush all fragments of a packet
that it can not reassemble, either due to a time-out or another error.
thus allowing incremental authentication of fragments.
Whereas, in the NDN context, MAC-s are not viable,
since doing so would require sharing a symmetric key
among all intervening routers.
B. Hash Functions
The last item above – the use of signatures – is what
most distinguishes delayed authentication in NDN from its IP
counterpart. NDN routers do not use symmetric cryptography
for packet authentication. Even if they did, assuming a key
shared among (possibly all) routers that forward a given
content is unrealistic. The only means of authenticating content
in routers is by verifying signatures. This prompts the question:
how to reconcile delayed authentication (of fragments) with
signatures?
We approach this issue by observing that a signature is
computed over a fixed-size hash digest (or simply hash) of
content, i.e., using the so-called “hash-and-sign” paradigm. A
hash provides integrity while a signature of a hash provides
authenticity or origin authentication. The underlying crypto-
graphic hash function H(·) must satisfy a set of standard
properties [22]. Unlike a MAC or a keyed hash [5], a hash
function requires no secret key and can be computed by
anyone.
Most modern hash functions operate on input of practically
any8 size. They typically use an iterative model (also known
as the Merkle-Damgard construction), whereby input is broken
into a number of fixed-size blocks and is processed one block
at a time by an internal compression function HC(·). The
latter forms the core of the hash function; after processing
each block, it produces an intermediate value (internal state
that we call IS) that is usually of the same size as the final
hash. In case of the first block, the intermediate state is fixed
and referred as the Initialization Vector (IV). The last block
is typically padded with zeros followed by the total input size
in bits. For example, the well-known SHA-256 [30] operates
on 512-bit blocks, maintains 256-bit internal state and yields
a 256-bit hash.
As described below, in constructing FIGOA, we take ad-
vantage of internal state produced by the underlying compres-
sion function HC(·). The main idea is to include, in each
fragment, the internal state of the hash function up to, but
not including, that fragment. This allows incremental hashing
of each fragment without having received either preceding or
subsequent fragment(s).
We assume that the absolute minimum MTU of any link or
interface that takes advantage of FIGOA is at least one block
of data, one block of internal state and whatever size is needed
to accommodate a content fragment header (i.e., content name,
flags, etc.). More precisely, we assume that any fragment must
carry at least a header, internal state and some data represented
as (at least one) some blocks of data. All data must be aligned
with block boundaries.
C. FIGOA Description
From here on, we use additional notation reflected in
Table II. The proposed scheme includes three main tasks,
8We consider 264 or 2128 bits as “practically any”.
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β block size of HC(·)
COn Raw (unsigned) content of total size n bits.
SIG(COn) Producer’s signature on COn.
CO
N
Signed version of COn of size N = n+ |SIG(COn)| bits.
bv,s Contiguous component of CO
N
where 0 ≤ v < N , i.e., bv,s
represents s bits, starting with offset v and ending with offset
v + s− 1, inclusive. s and v are multiples of β.
CFNv,s Fragment of CO
N
that carries bv,s.
ISv Internal state of HC(·) after processing v bits of input.
v is a multiple of β
hs Fragment header size, includes:
content name, v, s and ISv . See Section VI for details.
oMT U MTU of router’s outgoing interface.
aoMT U oMT U adjusted for fragment header size hs,
i.e., aoMT U = oMT U − hs
F Set of content fragments.
B Temporary buffer storing all fragments received so far.
TABLE II. NOTATION
described separately below.
1) Content Fragmentation: This task, shown in Algo-
rithm 1, is triggered whenever an NDN node (router or pro-
ducer) needs to forward a content object larger than oMT U .
Each resulting fragment CFNv,s includes: (1) s bits of original
content – bv,s, (2) starting offset v, and (3) ISv – intermediate
state, i.e., output of HC(·) on inputs of: IV and b0,v−1.9
(ISv = HC(IV, b0,v−1).) To simplify presentation, Algo-
rithm 1 makes two assumptions: First, aoMT U is a multiple
of β, i.e., aoMT U = s ∗ β. Second, N (signed content size)
is a multiple of aoMT U , i.e., N = k∗aoMT U , which makes
all fragments of equal size.
Algorithm 1: Fragment-Content
1: Input: signed content CON = b0,N−1, aoMT U , IV , HC(·)
2: Output: F
3: F := ∅, v = 0, ISv = IV
4: s = aoMT U/β, k = N/s
5: for i = 0, i < k, i++ do
6: CFNv,s := 〈 v, bv,s, ISv〉
7: F := F ∪ CFNv,s
8: ISv := HC(ISv, bv,s)
9: v = v + s
10: end for
11: Output F
2) Fragment Re-fragmentation: This task is very similar to
the initial fragmentation task, except that it is performed only
by NDN routers, and on content fragments, instead of content
objects.
3) Content Verification: As mentioned earlier, FIGOA pro-
vides integrity/authenticity for fragments received in any order.
Recall that a router or a consumer can unilaterally decide
whether to either: (1) incrementally verify integrity of each
fragment as it is received, or (2) defer overall verification until
all fragments are received. Regardless of the choice, a router
should forward each fragment in a cut-through fashion, i.e.,
without waiting for others to arrive. Moreover, a node receiving
fragments should store them in a buffer until the last fragment
arrives and (final or overall) verification is performed. (See
Section V-E.)
When a router performing incremental fragment verifica-
tion receives CFNv,s, one of the following cases occurs:
9In the very first fragment, v = 0 and ISv = IV .
1) CFNv,s is the very first received fragment. A new buffer B
is created where CFNv,s is placed. IS
∗
w = HC(ISv, bv,s)
is computed and stored.
2) Neither previous CFNu,s (for v = u + s) nor next CF
N
w,s
(for w = v+s) fragment is in the buffer. CFNv,s is placed
in B. IS∗w = HC(ISv, bv,s) is computed and stored.
3) CFNu,s is in the buffer (along with IS
∗
v ) but CF
N
w,s is not.
IS∗v must match ISv in CF
N
v,s. IS
∗
w = HC(ISv, bv,s) is
computed and stored.
4) CFNw,s is in the buffer but CF
N
u,s is not. IS
∗
w =
HC(ISv, bv,s) is computed and must match ISw from
CFNw,s.
5) Both CFNu,s and CF
N
w,s have already been received. IS
∗
v
must match ISv in CFNv,s IS
∗
w = HC(ISv, bv,s) is
computed and must match ISw from CFNw,s
Once the last fragment is received, authenticity of the entire
content can be finally verified. If verification fails, the last
fragment is dropped, the PIT entry is flushed, and nothing is
cached. The same applies for any failed check in the 5 cases
above. This process is illustrated in more detail in Algorithm 2.
We assume that routers perform incremental verification of
fragments and verify reassembled content signature. If signa-
ture verification is not possible, routers must verify that the
reassembled content hash matches the original content hash
included in every fragment (see Section VI for details.)
Algorithm 2: Verify-Fragment
1: Input: received CFNv,s, associated PIT entry e, HC(·)
2: Output: no output
3: if is first(CFNv,s) then
4: B := get new buffer();
5: end if
6: INSERT CFNv,s in B
7: STORE IS∗w = HC(ISv, bv,s)
8: if CFNu,s ∈ B and IS∗v 6= ISv in CFNv,s then
9: goto CleanUp
10: end if
11: if CFNw,s ∈ B and IS∗w 6= ISw of CFNw,s then
12: goto CleanUp
13: end if
14: if is not last(CFNv,s) then
15: FORWARD CFNv,s according to e
16: end if
17: if content complete() then
18: CON := assemble(B)
19: if verify sig(CON ) then
20: FORWARD CFNv,s according to e
21: CACHE CON
22: return
23: end if
24: end if
25: CleanUp: FLUSH B and e
D. Examples
We now describe FIGOA via two operational examples:
In the first example, consider a situation where CON has
two fragments: CFN0,s and CF
N
s,s, i.e. N = 2 × s. A router
R first receives CFN0,s. First, R invokes HC(·) iteratively and
computes IS∗s = HC(IV, b0,s). Then, it forwards CF
n
0,s out
on the interface(s) reflected in the corresponding PIT entry.
R creates a buffer for CO
N
where it records the fact that it
received the first s bits of content, along with the computed
IS∗s . Now, R receives CF
N
s,s. It compares stored IS
∗
s with ISs
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Fig. 4. Implementing Merkle-Damgard Construction to Generate Content
Fragments
carried in CFNs,s; if they do not match, R discards the buffer
and flushes the corresponding PIT entry. Otherwise, it invokes
HC(·) iteratively and computes IS∗N = HC(ISs, bs,s). At
the end, R extracts SIG(COn) (from the received content),
and computes a putative hash H ′ of entire reassembled COn.
Finally, R verifies whether SIG(COn) is the producer’s
signature on H ′. If so, CFNs,s is forwarded; otherwise, it is
discarded along with the buffer and the PIT entry. A similar
process takes place if CFN0,s and CF
N
s,s arrive out of order.
R first receives CFNs,s. Using ISs carried in this fragment, R
invokes HC(·) iteratively on each block of data and terminates
with IS∗N . Next, R forwards CF
N
s,s. Then, R creates a buffer
for CO
N
where it records the fact that it received the last
N − s bits (which is in fact the last s bits) of content, along
with ISs and IS∗N . Now, R receives CF
N
0,s. It invokes HC(·)
iteratively and computes IS∗s = HC(IV, b0,s) which should
match ISs received earlier as part of CFNs,s: if they do not
match, R discards the buffer and the PIT entry. Otherwise,
R computes a putative hash H ′ of entire reassembled COn,
extracts SIG(COn) and verifies whether it is the producer’s
signature on H ′. If so, CFN0,s is forwarded; otherwise, it
is discarded along with the buffer and the PIT entry. The
second operational example involves R receiving a fragment
CFNx,s of content CO
N
. The total size of this fragment is
(s + hs) bits. Suppose that, after processing this fragment as
in the first example, R needs to forward it out on an interface
with oMT U smaller than the total size of CFNx,s, e.g., R
needs to re-fragment it into two sub-fragments. R creates
CFNx,s′ with ISx and CF
N
y,s′ with ISy; where (1) s
′ < s,
(2) y = x + s′, (3) ISx is simply copied from CFNx,s, and
(4) ISy = HC(ISx, bx,s′). This example aims to show that
R can easily re-fragment already-fragmented content while
preserving overall content integrity.
Figure 4 demonstrates how to use any hash function
based on the Merkle-Damgard construction to generate content
fragments. The hash function used in Figure 4 is SHA-256, and
the length of input is discarded at the end of construction to
simplify demonstration.
E. Content Authentication
Although trust and key management are out of the scope
of this paper, we can not ignore the fact that authenticating a
content object requires not only the presence of a signature,
but also availability of a public key which must somehow
be trusted [14]. Recall that NDN stipulates that public keys
are encapsulated in named and signed content objects, i.e.,
a form of a certificate. Also, NDN allows the public key to
be either: (1) referred to by name within a content object
header, or (2) enclosed with the content object itself, using the
KeyLocator field.10 In the former case, unless the referred
public key is already cached, the router presumably must fetch
it by name, i.e., issue an interest for it. This is a burdensome
task that routers should not perform, for obvious reasons.
F. Security Analysis
Security of FIGOA is based on that of delayed authentica-
tion (DA).
We say that H(·) is constructed using the Merkle-Damgard
construction using its inner compression function HC(·) as a
building block. If HC(·) is collision-resistant, then so is H(·).
A function F is collision-resistant if it is “computationally
infeasible” to find inputs x 6= y such that F (x) = F (y). See
[22] for information regarding Merkle-Damgard construction
and hash-and-sign paradigm; also known as “digital signature
with appendix.”
A signature computed via hash-and-sign over an unfrag-
mented content object is considered secure. Whereas, with DA,
a content object is fragmented and we arrive at the final hash
of the content packet by incrementally hashing its fragments.
To subvert DA we consider an adversary who is given
a valid CO
N
with signature SIG(COn). The goal of the
adversary is to send to some router R a sequence of fragments,
CF ′N
′
x0=0,s, CF
′N ′
x1,s, . . . , CF
′N ′
xk,s
(xi+1 = xi + s, 0 ≤ i ≤
k − 1) corresponding to CO′N
′
6= CON with H(CO′xk) =
H(COn). Recall that CFNv,s embodies intermediate state ISv
of the hash function computed up to, but not including, v bits
of the entire content.
First, consider fragments arriving in order. R receives
CF ′N
′
0,s , initializes HC with IV , and computes and retains
IS′∗x1 = HC(IV, b0,s). Now, when R receives subsequent
fragments CF ′N
′
xi,s, i = 1, . . . , k, it compares the current
(computed) IS′∗x1 with IS
′
x1 contained in CF
′N ′
x1,s. If they
match, R invokes HC(·) iteratively over each block of CF ′N ′xi,s
using IS′xi as the starting intermediate state, and compares
obtained IS′∗xi+1 with IS
′
xi+1 in CF
′N ′
xi+1,s. This process is
exactly the same as computing H(·) over entire CO′N
′
. If
CO′
N ′ 6= CON , the adversary must have found a collision
for H(·), which violates our collision-resistance assumption.
Now, assume that fragments arrive out-of-order. R receives
CF ′N
′
xi,s. It can readily compute IS
′∗
xi+1 by invoking HC(·)
over the blocks starting with IS′xi . R retains IS
′
xi as part of
its state until IS′∗xi is computed (using all previous fragments)
and matched. If IS′∗xi has been already computed, then R
must have invoked HC(·) over the data in CF ′N ′xi−1,s using
IS′xi−1 . If R arrives at the final hash output and its state
contains only IS′∗N ′ , then R has compared IS′∗xi with IS
′
xi
for i = 1, . . . , k such that each match was successful. In other
words, all fragments have arrived and i = 1, . . . , k, IS′∗xi =
IS′xi . We observe that the set of equations that must be
10However, no trust management architecture is defined in NDN.
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satisfied here is exactly the same as that in the in-order-arrival
case. Therefore, the same argument applies.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the implementation of FIGOA
in CCNx version 0.8.2 [7] (latest version while writing this
paper.) Our implementation performs fragmentation with cut-
through switching, and intermediate reassembly. We strive to
remain as consistent and compatible with the existing CCNx
codebase, without changing the architecture or design except
to support fragmentation. Due to lack of support for signature
verification and key management in the implementation of
the CCNx codebase, our implementation does not support
signature verification of content objects processed by routers.
However, it can naturally be extend to authentication should
this feature becomes present in a future CCNx version.
CCNx is an open source content-centric networking stack
developed by Palo Alto Research Center (PARC). The software
suite comprises of a forwarder (ccnd) and client (libccn)
implemented in the C programming language. A client for
Java is also available. We refer to [8] for more detailed
specifications regarding the CCNx protocol.
Our implementation only requires modification of the for-
warder code. Our design limits fragmentation, reassembly, and
cut-through switching for outgoing interfaces. Therefore, a
forwarder must reassemble fragments prior to forwarding over
the content to the application.
To implement fragmentation, we introduce a new type of
NDN packet, ContentFragment. This packet is used for both
initial fragmentation of content objects and re-fragmentation
of content fragments. The structure of ContentFragment
contains the following fields:
• Name: identical to content name without an additional
implicit component digest.
• ContentObjectSize: size of the original content object
before fragmentation takes place.
• InternalState: stores internal state of a SHA-256
computation up to PayloadOffset of the content.
• PayloadOffset: specifies where the fragmented data
begins with respect to the unsigned content.
• PayloadSize: size of fragment payload, which is a
multiple of 512-bits (the input block size for SHA-256)
except for the last fragment.
• ContentDigest: contains the digest of the original con-
tent object. Appending this digest to the end of Name,
forms the content’s unique name. This field allows router
to match fragments with interests (in PIT) containing
the content digest as part of their names. Moreover, for
routers not verifying content signature, this field must
match the hash computed after reassembling the content.
• Payload: fragmented data of the content.
Once all fragments are received and the content is reassem-
bled, the router caches it, if its integrity is verified.
The above format lends itself to natural re-fragmentation.
If a ContentFragment requires further fragmentation
only InternalState, PayloadOffset, PayloadSize, and
Payload fields needs to be adjusted, reflecting the new
fragments. This prevents nested fragments and simplifies re-
assembly. Thus, increasing routers performance and reducing
consumers end-to-end latency.
To evaluate our implementation, we compare its perfor-
mance to an unmodified version of CCNx 0.8.2. This version
(similarly to the current NDN testbed) is running as an overlay
network on top of TCP or UDP. When TCP is used to connect
CCNx nodes, content larger than the negotiated MTU (at the
connection setup) will be segmented by TCP. This reduces
the chance of IP fragmentation to take place unless the MTU
dropped to a smaller value at an intermediate router. On
the other hand, when UDP is used, IP will be responsible
of fragmenting and reassembling content. In this case, every
CCNx node receives the whole content object from the UDP
socket after reassembly is performed by IP. For the purpose
of our experiments, we use UDP as a transport layer protocol
to compare the performance of our FIGOA implementation to
that of IP fragmentation.
VII. EVALUATION
We employ a server equipped with 8-core Intel i7-3770
CPU at 3.40GHz and 16GB of memory. The server runs
Ubuntu 12.10 and KVM hypervisor to run virtual machines.
We construct a testbed by provisioning virtual machines to act
as CCNx nodes interconnected in the same LAN and NATed
by the host server. Each node is connected to virtual Ethernet
interface at 100Mbps and MTU set to 1500 bytes.
Experiments are run on a 3, 4, and 5 nodes linear-topology.
The first hop acts as consumer sending interests with a specific
content published by the last hop (the producer). For each
topology, we run the experiments in which consumers request
content with data size of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32 KB. The
reason we chose a linear-topology is because content objects
and fragments always follow the same path, in reverse, of
preceding interests.
Results are shown in Figure 5 demonstrating the average
consumer end-to-end latency measured from many repeated
experiments.11 For all settings, IP performs consistently better
than our cut-through approach. The bottleneck of FIGOA is
that routers need to perform additional processing to com-
pute the hash of every fragment. Since all computations are
currently performed in software, these results make sense.
However, we believe that once NDN/CCN is deployed as a
replacement of IP, all nodes (especially routers) will be capable
of performing hash computation at the hardware level at a rate
much faster than what is shown in Figure 5.
We run another 3 nodes experiment that involves refrag-
menting fragments. We measure the end-to-end latency at the
consumer for different values of intermediate router’s MTU
(1500, 1100, and 700 bytes). Consumer pulls content of size
4KB. In the case of MTU value equal to 1500 bytes, the
content is fragmented (at the producer) into 4 fragments, each,
except the last one, is of size 1152 bytes12 of effective fragment
payload plus fragment header length. However, when MTU
drops to 1100 bytes (at the intermediate router), the payload
length of each outgoing becomes 768 bytes, leading to re-
fragmentation of each fragment into 2 smaller ones. Similarly,
11All nodes start with an empty cache at the beginning of every experiments.
12Multiple of SHA-256 block size which is 64 bytes.
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Fig. 5. End-to-end latency of various sized content retrieval. IP represents the unmodified version of CCNx and NDN represents FIGOA. The values above
the bars represent the difference between NDN and IP fragmentation (NDN / IP).
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Fig. 6. End-to-end latency of various MTU-s at intermediate routers for
content size 4KB. IP represents the unmodified version of CCNx and NDN
represents FIGOA. Values above the bars represent the difference between
NDN and IP fragmentation (NDN/IP).
each fragment is re-fragmented into 3 smaller fragments when
MTU value drops to 700 bytes.
Results are shown in Figure 6. We can notice that when
MTU value decreases, the end-to-end latency increases for
a fixed content size. This is a logical conclusion due to the
fact that smaller MTU leads to more processing imposed
by re-fragmentation. Although re-fragmentation using FIGOA
requires additional hash computations at each hop after where
re-fragmentation occurs13, the ratio of NDN end-to-end latency
to IP end-to-end latency is not increasing dramatically. The
reason is due to the fact that when fragmentation happens at
the IP layer, reassembling the content is required at every hop
before it is delivered by the UDP socket to NDN. Since this
is not the case when FIGOA is implemented, IP reassembly
adds more end-to-end latency that compensates the additional
hash computation overhead imposed by FIGOA.14
13Recall that IP re-fragmentation does not required hash computation.
14Refer to Section IV-C for more details about the delay imposed by IP
reassembly at each hope.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Related work falls into several categories discussed here.
A. Secure Fragmentation
The first attempt to address security in IP fragmentation is
[33] which tackled a specific problem of how to authenticate,
in egress/ingress routers, fragmented IP packets. A source host
is assumed to share a key with appropriate router(s). Two
techniques are proposed: The first one is delayed authenti-
cation (DA) where an authenticating router verifies a packet
MAC incrementally from its fragments. Since fragments of
the same packet might flow through different routers, to
prevent reassembly of a corrupted packet at the destination,
an authenticating router holds one small fragment “hostage”
until authenticity of the entire packet authenticity is confirmed.
The second scheme is an MTU probe mechanism that a
source host can use to pre-segment a large packet into smaller
authentic packets sized to the smallest MTU on the (current)
path. Some extensions to [33] were later proposed in [26]:
extended delayed authentication (EDA) requires fragments to
always traverse the same path. [26] also provides a detailed
comparison of several secure fragmentation techniques.
[25] presents a secure fragmentation scheme for Delay-
Tolerant Networks (DTN) [9]. This scheme is referred to as
“toilet-paper” approach to securing fragments. The basic idea
is that, prior to bundling, data is checkpointed into fragments
using cryptographic hash at specified intervals. Hashes are
included in a bundle and authenticated with a signature. Given
a fragment, the hash, and the signature a gateway can authorize
if the fragmented data should be delivered over the link. A
variation of the scheme allows for variable increments of au-
thentic fragments, allowing routers greater flexibility to choose
fragment size potentially saving valuable link resources.
An enhancement to the “toilet-paper” approach is presented
in [4]. After bundle fragmentation occurs, senders build a hash
tree and only sign the root node. Fragment verification requires
the knowledge of this signature and log(n) hashes (where
n is the number of fragments). To verify the authenticity of
all fragments, verifiers compute n log(n) hashes and a single
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signature verification, instead of n hashes and n signature
verification operations. However, these approaches are not
applicable in NDN since they both lack the support of in-
network fragmentation. Moreover, in FIGOA, verifying all
fragments requires the computation of only n hashes and one
signature verification.
Today, most networks employ IPSec [13] to provide
network-level authentication in IP networks. IPSec is com-
patible with both IPv4 and IPv6. IPSec operates in transport
and tunnel mode. Transport mode is used by two hosts which
establish a security association (exchanging keys) to authenti-
cate and encrypt IP payloads. Tunnel mode allows the creation
of secure Virtual Private Networks (VPN) which comprise of
IPSec-enabled gateways that share bilateral security associa-
tions. Gateways secure and authenticate whole IP datagrams,
encapsulating them as payloads for IP datagrams destined for
processing between IPsec-enabled gateways.
Regardless of mode chosen, fragmentation of packets be-
tween IPSec-enabled hosts (gateways) occurs at the IP layer.
Since IPSec authenticated/encrypted packets have a destination
address of another IPSec-capable host (or gateway), it must
undergo packet-level scrutiny which requires reassembly of the
packet. In essence hop-by-hop reassembly at IPSec adjacent
hosts ensures that security is not subverted.
B. Fragmentation in ICN
CCNx currently serves as a reference implementation for
NDN. It currently supports TCP/UDP tunnels to interconnect
forwarders. Fragmentation is relegated to IP, limiting the
maximum packet size to that of IP. Hop-by-hop reassembly
allows routers to authenticate content (although not presently
supported in the forwarder implementation), but at the in-
creased cost of reassembly.
NDN Link Protocol (NDNLP) [31] attempts to amend this
issue while allowing operation over both link-layer and virtual
transports, such as Ethernet and TCP/UDP. Fragmentation
occurs for both interest and content packets. It specifically
features intermediate reassembly and therefore remains com-
patible with NDN security requirement, however uses an in-
compatible packet format to support cut-through fragmentation
which can result in incurred delay. NDNLP also supports
reliability layer.
The CCN-lite project [6] aims to provide a “level-0”
forwarder for CCN. It is compatible with the CCNx protocol
and provides a rudimentary implementation of the forwarder
with simple data structures for PIT, FIB, and CS. Native
fragmentation and reassembly is supported over Ethernet and
TCP/UDP. Fragments are identified by sequence number with-
out any addressing scheme on per-fragment basis implying
cut-through fragmentation is not supported. The fragmentation
scheme also provides optional support for reliable fragments
transmission.
CONET [12] is a derivative ICN of CCNx. In [28] a
transport scheme called ICN Transport Protocol (ICTP) is
specified, which implements TCP native to ICN. Similar to
TCP, ICTP segments data to avoid further fragmentation. In
essence, this provides cut-through delivery of fragments. Akin
to TCP, this doesn’t prevent fragmentation from occurring at a
lower-layer. Unlike our scheme, ICTP does not address content
authentication at intermediate routers.
The NetInf project [10] is an emerging ICN architec-
ture which supports location-independent named data objects
(NDO) (similar to content objects in NDN/CCN). NDOs are
signed and cacheable units. The project does not envisage a
scheme for segmentation and relies on a “convergence layer”
(CL) to synthesize necessary services for heterogeneous trans-
ports used to connect NetInf gateways. The CL is delegated the
responsibility of fragmentation and reassembly of NDOs. With
no native fragmentation and reassembly scheme available,
NetInf appears to rely on intra-hop reassembly for verification
of NDO authenticity.
IX. CONCLUSION
Secure fragmentation is an important issue in NDN. It is
complicated by the rule that each content object must be signed
by its producer. Thus far, fragmentation of content objects has
been considered incompatible with NDN since it precludes
authentication of individual fragments by routers. In this paper,
we showed that secure and efficient content fragmentation is
both possible and advantageous in NDN and similar architec-
tures that involve signed content. We demonstrated a concrete
technique (FIGOA) that facilitates efficient and secure content
fragmentation in NDN, discussed its security features and
assessed its performance. Finally, we described a prototype
implementation and presented preliminary results.
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